In this research article, we explore the use of a design process for adapting existing cyber risk assessment standards to allow the calculation of economic impact from IoT cyber risk. The paper presents a new model that includes a design process with new risk assessment vectors, specific for IoT cyber risk. To design new risk assessment vectors for IoT, the study applied a range of methodologies, including literature review, empirical study and comparative study, followed by theoretical analysis and grounded theory. An epistemological framework emerges from applying the constructivist grounded theory methodology to draw on knowledge from existing cyber risk frameworks, models and methodologies. This framework presents the current gaps in cyber risk standards and policies, and defines the design principles of future cyber risk impact assessment. The core contribution of the article therefore, being the presentation of a new model for impact assessment of IoT cyber risk.
INTRODUCTION
There is a strong interest in industry and academia to standardise existing cyber risk assessment standards. Standardisation of cyber security frameworks, models and methodologies is an attempt to combine existing standards. This has not been done until present. Standardisation in this article refers to the compounding of knowledge to advance the efforts on integrating cyber risk standards and governance, and to offer a better understanding of cyber risk assessments. Here we combine literature analysis (Ezell et al., 2010 ) with epistemological analysis, and an empirical (Davis, Garcia and Zhang, 2009 ) with a comparative study . The empirical study is conducted with fifteen national high-technology (high-tech) strategies, seven cyber risk frameworks and two cyber risk models. The comparative study engages with fifteen high-tech national strategies. The epistemological analysis and an empirical study seek to probe the current understanding of cyber risk impact assessment.
To adapt the current cyber security standards, firstly the specific IoT cyber risk vectors need to be identified. By risk vectors, we refer to Internet of Things (IoT) attack vectors from particular approach used, to exploit big data vulnerabilities (Choi and Lambert, 2017) .
Subsequently, these specific risk vectors need to be integrated in a holistic cyber risk impact assessment model (Gisladottir et al., 2017) .
documented process represents a new design for mapping and optimising IoT cyber security and assessing its associated impact. We discuss and expand on these further in the remainder of this article. The research article is structured in the following format. In Section 2 we present the research methodology. In Section 3 we conduct literature review. In section 4 we propose the IoT cyber risk vectors by conducting a comparative study of national high-tech strategies and initiatives. In section 5 we propose the design principles for impact assessment of IoT cyber risk by conducting empirical study cyber security frameworks, methods and quantitative models. In Section 6 we evaluate the design principles by conducting theoretical analysis to uncover the best method to define a unified cyber risk assessment. In section 7 we propose a new epistemological framework for cyber risk assessment standardisation and we discuss the new impact assessment principles. In Section 8 we present the conclusions and limitations of the research.
METHODOLOGY
The methods applied in this study consist of literature review, comparative study, empirical analysis, theoretical and epistemological analysis and case study workshops. The selection of methodologies is based on their flexibility to be applied simultaneously to analyse the same research topic from different perspectives. We use practical studies of major projects in the I4.0 to showcase recent developments of IoT systems in the context of I4.0 high-tech strategies. We need practical studies to bridge the gaps, to assess the impact and overcome some of the cyber risk limitations and to construct the relationship between IoT and high-tech strategies. The proposed design principles support the process of building a holistic IoT cyber risk impact assessment model.
Theoretical analysis
The methodology applies theoretical analysis through logical discourse of knowledge, also known as epistemological analysis. An epistemological analysis enables an investigation on how existing knowledge is justified and what makes justified beliefs justified (Steup, 2005) , what does it mean to say that we understand something (Wenning, 2009 ) and how do we understand that we understand.
If the Cloud architecture is properly engineered, the security of the cloud instance is adequately maintained and the connectivity from cloud to Thing can be assured, then cyber risks can be reduced with cloud technologies (Ribeiro, Barata and Ferreira, 2010) (Thramboulidis, 2015) (Giordano, Spezzano and Vinci, 2016) (Shafiq et al., 2015) (Wahlster et al., 2013) . To ensure cyber risk is reduced, cloud technologies should be supported with: internet-based system, service platforms (La and Kim, 2010; Dillon et al., 2011; Wahlster et al., 2013; Wan, Cai and Zhou, 2015; Weyer et al., 2015) , processes, services (Stock and Seliger, 2016; Hussain, 2017) (Brettel et al., 2016; Hermann, Pentek and Otto, 2016; Wang et al., 2016) , for machine decision making (Evans and Annunziata, 2012; Wang, 2013) (Wahlster et al., 2013; Shafiq et al., 2015) . Creating cyber service architecture (La and Kim, 2010; Wang, Törngren and Onori, 2015; Weyer et al., 2015) and cloud distributed manufacturing planning (Wang, 2013; Wan, Cai and Zhou, 2015) (Faller and Feldmüller, 2015; Posada et al., 2015) . Cyber risk mitigation also require compiling of data, processes, devices and systems (Evans and Annunziata, 2012; Shafiq et al., 2015) , connection to model-driven systems (Jensen, Chang and Lee, 2011; Shi et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2014) , and model-based platforms (Stojmenovic, 2014; Ringert, Rumpe and Wortmann, 2015) , for cyber manufacturing (Wahlster et al., 2013; Lee, Kao and Yang, 2014; Bauer et al., 2015; Wan, Cai and Zhou, 2015) . IoT technologies need to be supported with a life cycle process for updating the list of assets that are added to the network across multiple timescales (Benveniste, 2010; Benveniste, Bouillard and Caspi, 2010; Sokolov and Ivanov, 2015) .
IoT cyber risk is also present in components modified to enable a disruption (Evans and Annunziata, 2012; DiMase et al., 2015) . One option by which such risk could be mitigated is to consider the standardisation of the IoT design and process (Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, Damm and Passerone, 2012; Ruan, 2017) ; unfortunately however, such system security is complex (Lu et al., 2013; Ganin et al., 2017; Woods et al., 2017; Haimes, 2018) and risk University of Oxford 8 assessing IoT systems is still a key problem in research (Nurse, Creese and De Roure, 2017) .
Nevertheless, cyber networks need to be secure, vigilant, resilient and fully integrated (Giordano, Spezzano and Vinci, 2016) (Bhave et al., 2010) . Therefore, the IoT need to encompass the security and privacy (Zhu, Rieger and Basar, 2011) , along with electronic and physical security of real-time data (Niggemann et al., 2015; Almeida, Santos and Oliveira, 2016) .
The IoT consists of heterogeneous cloud technologies and varying lifecycle of the IoT devices, the question of value (Nicolescu et al., 2018a (Nicolescu et al., , 2018b ; Taylor, P., Allpress, S., Carr, M., Lupu, E., Norton, J., in inheriting outdated data (Tan, Goddard and Pérez, 2008; Ruffle et al., 2014; Ruan, 2017) where machines store knowledge and create a virtual living representation in the cloud (Drath and Horch, 2014) . The access to existing knowledge could be of value to design more resilient systems and processes in the future.
Cyber risk from social machines and real-time technologies
Cyber risk emerges from the Web, but also from any interface to a digital processing component, wired and wireless and the entire Web can be perceived as a social machine (Hall and Tiropanis, 2012) . The term social machines in the context of this paper is used in relation to systems that depend on interaction between humans and technology and enable real time output or action, such as Facebook and Twitter. Social machines (Giordano, Spezzano and Vinci, 2016) are vulnerable to cyber risks, because of the connection between physical and human networks (Evans and Annunziata, 2012; Marwedel and Engel, 2016) , operating as systems of systems (Wang, Törngren and Onori, 2015; Leitão, Colombo and Karnouskos, 2016) , and mechanisms for real-time feedback (Tan, Goddard and Pérez, 2008; Shi et al., 2011; Kang, Kapitanova and Son, 2012; Marwedel and Engel, 2016) . Cyber risk from realtime IoT technology (Hermann, Pentek and Otto, 2016) requires information security for data in transit (Longstaff and Haimes, 2002; DiMase et al., 2015; Toro, Barandiaran and Posada, 2015) . In addition, access control is required for granting or denying requests for information and processing services (Rajkumar et al., 2010; Evans and Annunziata, 2012; DiMase et al., 2015) . Despite expectations that information security and access control for social machines exists, the business of personal data has triggered many privacy concerns for social machines such as Facebook and Google (Esteve, 2017) . Some of these concerns have already materialised (Arnold and Teppler, 2018; Hindman, 2018) . IoT brings inherent cyber risks which require appropriate cyber recovery plans. The relationship between IoT cyber risk assessment and recovery planning emerges from new processes, such as machine learning, that can be used to patch known vulnerabilities in real-time.
IoT cyber risk vectors from the literature review
The IoT cyber risk vectors relate to the overall aim of defining the design principles for cyber risk impact assessment. Prior to assessing the impact, we required an understanding of the IoT risk. The reality of assessing security risks in Internet of Things systems is that 'If you can't understand it, you can't properly assess it!' .
A list of IoT cyber risk vectors derive from the literature review.
• The cloud technologies enhance cyber security but amplify IoT cyber risk (Ribeiro, Barata and Ferreira, 2010; Wahlster et al., 2013; Shafiq et al., 2015; Thramboulidis, 2015; Giordano, Spezzano and Vinci, 2016 ).
• IoT depends on real-time data, but real-time data amplifies IoT cyber risk (Niggemann et al., 2015; Almeida, Santos and Oliveira, 2016) .
• IoT cyber risk mitigation needs autonomous cognition, but autonomous machine decisions amplify IoT cyber risk (Kolberg and Zühlke, 2015; Lee, Bagheri and Kao, 2015; Toro, Barandiaran and Posada, 2015; Wan, Cai and Zhou, 2015; Weyer et al., 2015) .
• These IoT cyber risk vectors are not clearly visible and focus should be on the communications risk; whether conventional wired (broadband or IP networks) or wireless (W-Fi, Bluetooth and 3G/4G) -the connectivity is one of the weak spots.
While there are many more cyber risk vectors, analysing every single risk vector was considered beyond the scope of this study and the focus was placed on the most prominent vectors as identified in the literature. The idea was to identify a risk assessment process that can be applied by future researchers to many different risk vectors. The IoT risk vectors outlined above are analysed in the following section through comparative analysis of cyber risk in high-tech strategies.
COMPARATIVE STUDY ON IOT CYBER RISK IN HIGH-TECH STRATEGIES
This section represents a comparative study of national high-tech strategies, because the IoT is strongly represented in the Industry 4.0. The selection of hightech strategies -sources for analysis is based on the richness of the documented processes.
The comparative study is applied on a range of IoT high-technology strategies to enhance the framework and to build upon previous literature on this subject (Petar Radanliev et al., 2018) .
Defining the most prominent IoT cyber risk vectors is of crucial importance to understanding IoT cyber risk, because IoT cyber risk is often invisible to cyber security experts. In this section, the study intent is to analyse Industry 4.0 and present it as an example of how risk assessment takes place at the national level.
Understanding IoT cyber risk in national high-tech strategies
The current direction of impact assessment from IoT cyber risk, seems to be decided by assessment activities, e.g. workgroups (IVI, 2017) or testbeds (IIC, 2017) , supported by economic assessments (Catapult UK, 2017) . In some strategies, impact is decided by assessing key projects in the digital industry, e.g. Fabbrica Intelligente (MIUR, 2014) and The different approaches to impact assessment, could be resulting from the differences in IoT focus. The Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC, 2016 (IIC, , 2017 focuses on promoting core IoT industries; while the New France Industrial (NFI) (NIF, 2016) , the High Value Manufacturing Catapult (HVM) (John, 2017) Radanliev, C. D. .
The Table 1 summarises the analysis of the comparative study. The most prominent IoT cyber risk vectors derive from the analysis and are presented in a comparative decomposition approach. The aim of the comparative analysis and decomposition is to show the IoT cyber risk vectors and areas not covered (gaps) in national high-tech strategies. Secondly, the comparative analysis and decomposition enables visualising how the areas not covered in one high-tech strategy, have been addressed in other high-tech strategies. Therefore, the comparative study enables standardisation of approaches. The Table 1 enables policy makers to firstly identify the gaps and secondly to identify the best approach to address individual risk vectors. However, the analysis in Table 1 is limited to the most prominent vectors as identified in existing literature previously in section 3.1.
Most prominent IoT cyber risk vectors Vectors
Vector 1 Not covered.
(2) Catapults (John, 2017 Table 1 , follows the grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) , and categorises the areas not covered in IoT risk vectors, to construct the cyber assessment design principles.
In the following sections, a more general assessment is being presented and the national plans analysed are presented in a broader sense that take in more of the landscape of IoT implementation.
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CYBER SECURITY STANDARDS
A key part of understanding the risks and issues facing the IoT involves reflecting on the standards and models present today. In what follows, we reflect on seven cyber risk standards and two cyber risk models. The design initiates with integrating best practices. Through empirical analysis (Davis, Garcia and Zhang, 2009) , we compare existing cyber security measures and standards (e.g. FAIR and NIST cyber security frameworks) to propose a new and improved design principles for calculating the economic impact of IoT cyber risk.
The analysis presented in this section emerge from the analysis in this study, but also represent a stand-alone piece of work because the nature of security frameworks and assessment tools is quite diverse. What is presented in this section is an attempt to apply comparative analysis to synthesize a common, best practice approach that pulls the best features from each of the frameworks into a single, theoretical approach.
Empirical analysis of cyber security frameworks, models and methodologies
A majority of the cyber security frameworks today apply qualitative approaches to measuring cyber risk (FIRST, no date; Caralli et al., 2007; Wynn et al., 2011; NIST, 2016; CMMI, 2017) . Some of the frameworks propose diverse qualitative methods, such as OCTAVE, which stands for Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (Caralli et al., 2007) and recommends three levels of risk (low, medium, high). Methodologies, such as the Threat Assessment & Remediation Analysis (TARA) (Wynn et al., 2011) Considering the lack of more precise methods, the modified base metrics represent the state of the art at present. The supply chain cyber risks are also assessed with qualitative approaches (Radanliev, 2014 (Radanliev, , 2015c (Radanliev, , 2015a (Radanliev, , 2015b Radanliev, Rowlands and Thomas, 2014; Petar Radanliev, Charles De Roure, et al., 2019 Notable for this discussion, only ISO 27031 and NIST (NIST, 2016) provide recommendations for recovery planning, which some of the other frameworks and models have focused on less. A key point to note here is that risk estimation is used for recovery planning, and as such quantitative risk impact estimation (Allodi and Massacci, 2017 ) is needed for making decisions on topics such as cyber risk insurance (Öğüt, Raghunathan and Menon, 2011) . The quantitative risk assessment approaches e.g. FAIR (FAIR, 2017a), RiskLens (RiskLens, 2017), and CyVaR (FAIR, 2017b) , are still be in their infancy. Hence, the state of the art in current risk estimation (also known as risk analysis) is based on the high, medium, low scales (also known as the trafic lights system or colour system).
The diversity of approaches for cyber risk impact assessment, reemphasises the requirement for standardisation of cyber risk assessment approaches. The diversity and the gaps in the proposed approaches, become clearly visible in Table 2 . This diversity presents conflict in risk assessment, e.g. qualitative versus quantitative. To enable the standardisation design, in Table 2 , core cyber impact assessment concepts are extracted to defining the design principles for cyber risk impact assessment from IoT vectors. The design principles initiate with defining how to measure, standardise and compute cyber risk and how to recover. These are defined as:
• Measure -calculate economic impact of cyber risk.
• Standardise -international cyber risk assessment approach.
• Compute -quantify cyber risk.
• Recover -plan for impact of cyber-attacks, e.g. cyber insurance. 
Frameworks

THEORETICAL ANALYSIS TO UNCOVER THE BEST METHOD TO DEFINE A UNIFIED CYBER RISK ASSESSMENT
The above empirical and comparative analysis correlated academic literature with government and industry cyber security frameworks, models and methodologies. In this section, epistemological analysis is applied to probe the existing understanding of cyber risk assessment. Such an approach was considered appropriate for our purposes because most cyber security frameworks and methodologies propose answers to a quantitative question with qualitative assessments. The analysis in this study examines how the current cyber risk assessment approaches are based on conventional abstractions, for instance, the colour coding in the NIST framework traffic light protocol (Johnson et al., 2016) , or the mathematical approximation in CVSS (CVSS, 2017) . In quantified cases, we may have a modified attack vector allocated to a numerical value of 0.85 for a network metric value, and a numerical value of 0.62 for adjacent network metric value (FIRST, no date). The question is why 0.85 and why 0.62 and why red represents information not for disclosure (Johnson et al., 2016) .
These measurements represent conventional abstractions that when expressed, become important units of measurement. These units of measurement in effect represent symbols with a defined set of rules in a conventional system, where truths about their validity can be derived from expert opinions, hence proven to be correct. These units of measurement do not, however, represent quantitative units based on statistical methods for predicting uncertainty.
Knowledge requires 'truth, belief and justification' as individual conditions (Steup, 2005) .
Knowledge that a numerical value of 0.62 is 'true' metric value for adjacent network, as the related CVSS approach 'believes', needs to be 'justified' to confirm it does not represent just a guess of luck. Since a numerical value. Justification needs to be based on evidentialism (Conee and Feldman, 2004; Mittag, 2011) , where a proposition e.g. numerical value of 0.62, is epistemically justified as determined entirely by evidence. The debate whether cyber risk standards can be epistemically justified, must be based on the facts and evidence currently available. In evidentialism, epistemic evaluations are separate from moral believes and practical assessments, as epistemically justified evaluations might conflict with moral and practical estimations (Conee and Feldman, 2004) .
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
The integration of the theoretical analysis, with the empirical study of existing models with the comparative study of national strategies leads to a new epistemological framework consistent of sets of techniques for impact assessment of IoT cyber risk. Subsequently, a grounded theory approach is applied on the results of the epistemological framework with the output of the case study research into IoT cyber trends and technologies. The case study research is not applied to identify new, or the most prominent risk vectors. It would be challenging to argue that there is no bias if the vectors came from a limited population of stakeholders. The case study research simply represents an example of how the epistemological framework could be applied in a step by step process.
Proposed epistemological framework for cyber risk assessment standardisation
To define a standardisation framework, firstly the Pugh controlled convergence (Pugh, 1991) is applied with a group of experts in the field. The Pugh controlled convergence is a time-tested method for concept selection and for validation of research design. The results from the comparative study and the empirical analysis were presented, including the Figure 1 and 2, to a group of experts. The Pugh controlled convergence (Pugh, 1991) In the assessment and transcription process, discourse analysis is applied to interpret the data (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008) and for recognising the most profound concepts in the data (Goulding, 2002) . The findings from the workshops are summarised in the table below (Table   3 ). The findings are presented in Table 3 after the controlled convergence was performed on all five workshops. The controlled convergence resulted with some units of analysis being merged to avoid duplication, such as Cloud-based computing (DCMS, 2017); and Cloud computing (Wahlster et al., 2013) . Or the concepts of CPS, which was identified as vector 2 in multiple high-tech strategies (Wahlster et al., 2013; MEICA, 2015; Sirris and Agoria, 2017) . Similarly, the units of analysis of cyber risk standards are presented as merged definitions of the design principles, as categorised on the controlled convergence workshops.
The Table 3 below presents an epistemological framework of the knowledge and understanding, gathered from the comparative empirical analysis. The epistemological framework in Table 3 presents a narrowed framework of current understanding of IoT cyber risk, which is analysed and verified with the Pugh controlled convergence method for concept selection and for validation of research design. The epistemological framework in Table 3 defines the IoT cyber risk vectors and relates the risk vectors with units of analysis. Defining the IoT cyber risk vectors and the related units of analysis, represents a crucial milestone in defining the design principles for cyber risk assessment of IoT. The epistemological framework in Table 3 proposes the design principles for measuring, standardising, computing and recovering from IoT risk. An example of how the epistemological framework in Table 3 can be applied:
• Measure the 'vector 3': economic impact of cyber risk from autonomous 'robotics in IoT' -calculate economic impact of cyber risk with 'BetaPERT distributions'.
• Standardise the 'vector 3' -international cyber risk impact from autonomous 'robotics in IoT' -assessment approach with 'Mathematical approximation'.
• Compute the impact from 'vector 3': economic impact of cyber risk from autonomous
'robotics in IoT'-quantify cyber risk with 'Quantitative risk analytics with Monte
Carlo and sensitivity analysis'.
• Recovery planning for the 'vector 3': calculate financial cost from cyber risk from autonomous 'robotics in IoT' and determine maximum acceptable 'level of exposure'
for 'system recovery' -plan for cyber insurance for the determined 'level of exposure'.
This example covers only one risk vector and one unit of analysis. The example is appropriate for an enterprise that aims to deploy autonomous robotics in IoT. National hightech strategies would need to perform all analysis, for all risk vectors, with all units of analysis provided in the epistemological framework in Table 3 . It is surprising that national high-tech strategies have not until present performed such analysis. Especially concerning are the findings from the gap analysis in Table 1 which confirms that many of the areas covered by the epistemological framework in Table 3 are not covered in some of the national hightech national strategies. An example of how such analysis could be performed in provided in Figure 1 below. This design process follows recommendations from literature (Strader, Lin and Shaw, 1999) , and shows how individual cyber risk components can be integrated into an impact assessment standardisation infrastructure. The epistemological framework is promoting the development of a generally accepted cyber security approach. This is also called for in current research work (Nurse, Creese and De Roure, 2017 ; P. Radanliev, C. D.
De , because the IoT adoption requires standardisation reference architecture (Ahmed, Kim and Kim, 2013; Wahlster et al., 2013; Weyer et al., 2015; Stock and Seliger, 2016) to encompass security and privacy (Zhu, Rieger and Basar, 2011) .
Defining the design principles for cyber risk assessment of IoT vectors
In the section above, we propose a new set of design principles for assessing the cyber risk from IoT risk vectors. The principles had been tested through workshops and a comparative study to ensure the process can be applied in real-world practice. The comparative study
shows that IoT trends have failed to implement the recovery planning. This is in contradiction with the findings from the second reflection of the empirical study of cyber risk assessment standards, where the recovery planning is strongly emphasised (see : ISO vectors, but to the most prominent risk vectors. Considering that such study has not been conducted until present, the process of integrating the most prominent vectors, with a comparative analysis of the a diverse set of security frameworks and tools, represents the first step in understanding the standardisation process. The design principles in Figure 1 , also present multiple approaches to calculating the economic risk of IoT implementation (e.g.
BetaPert, Cyber VaR, RiskLense). This connects the design with the described issues related to the costs of risk.
Discussion
The research problem investigated in this article was the present lack of standardised methodology that would measure the cost and probabilities of cyber-attacks in specific IoT related verticals (ex. connected spaces or commercial and industrial IoT equipment) and the economic impact (IoT product, service or platform related) of such cyber risk.
The lack of recovery planning is consistent in all of the high-tech strategies reviewed. Adding to this, the new risks emerging from IoT connected devices and services, and the lack of economic impact assessments from IoT cyber risks, makes it imperative to emphasise the lack of recovery planning. The volume of data generated by the IoT devices creates diverse challenges in variety of verticals (e.g. machine learning, ethics, business models).
Simultaneously, to design and build cyber security architecture for complex coupled IoT systems, while understanding the economic impact, demands bold new solutions for optimisation and decision making (Nurse, Creese and De Roure, 2017) . Much of the research is application-oriented and by default interdisciplinary, requiring hybrid research in different academic areas. Hybrid and interdisciplinary approaches are required, for the design of cyber risk assessment that integrate economic impact from IoT verticals. Such design must meet public acceptability, security standards, and legal scrutiny.
As a result of the fast growth of the IoT, cyber risk finance and insurance markets are lacking empirical data to construct actuarial tables. Despite the development of models related to the impact of cyber risk, there is a lack of such models related to specific IoT verticals. Hence, banks and insurers are unable to price IoT cyber risk with the same precision as in traditional insurance lines. Even more concerning, the current macroeconomic costs estimates of cyberattacks related to IoT products, services and platforms are entirely speculative. The approach by 'early adopters' that IoT products are 'secure by default' is misleading. Even governments advocate security standards ex. standards like ISA 99, or C2M2 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014 Energy, , 2015 that accept that the truth on the ground is that IoT devices are unable to secure themselves, so the logical placement of security capability is in the communications network.
CONCLUSION
This article decomposes the cyber risk assessment standards and combines concepts for the The model proposes a process for adapting existing cyber security practices and standards to include IoT cyber risk. Despite the interest to standardise existing cyber risk frameworks, models and methodologies, this has not been done until present. Standardisation framework currently does not exist in literature and the epistemological framework represents the first attempt to define the standardisation process for cyber risk impact assessment of IoT vectors.
This article applies empirical (via literature reviews and workshops) and comparative studies with theoretical analysis and the grounded theory to define a process of standardisation of cyber risk impact assessment approaches. The study advances the efforts of integrating standards and governance on IoT cyber risk and offers a better understanding of a holistic impact assessment approach for cyber risk. The documented process represents a new design for mapping and optimising IoT cyber security.
The empirical study defined the gaps in current cyber risk assessment frameworks, models and methodologies. The identified gaps are analysed to define a process of decomposing risks and compounding assessment concepts, to address the gaps in cyber risk standards. The comparative study defines the IoT cyber risk vectors which are not anticipated or considered in existing cyber risk assessment standards. The epistemological analysis adapts the current cyber security standards and defines the principles for integrating specific IoT risk vectors in a holistic impact assessment framework. It is anticipated that the analysis of the complete economic impact of data compromise of IoT risk vectors, would empower the communications network providers to create clear, rigorous, industry-accepted mechanisms to measure, control, analyse, distribute and manage critical data needed to develop, deploy and operate cost-effective cyber security for critical infrastructure. The research design identifies and captures the IoT cyber risk vectors and defines a framework for adapting existing cyber risk standards to include IoT cyber risk.
Limitations and further research
The epistemological framework in this article is derived from empirical and comparative studies, supported with theoretical analysis of a limited set of frameworks, models, methodologies and high-tech strategies. The set selection was based on documented availability and on relevance to cyber risk impact assessment of IoT risk vectors. Holistic analysis of all risk assessment approaches was considered beyond the scope of this study.
Additional research is required to integrate the knowledge from other studies. 
